The integral part can be evaluated which can thus be expressed in the form 100, m B 10-31 where 2F1( . , . , . ; . ) is the Gaussian confluent hypergeometric function. Let us define x = m -(1/6) = -m/d, we can express (6) with the help of [7] as U L m + 0.5) r . .
where, B, ( , ) is the incomplete beta function defined in [7] . The expression in (8) is plotted in Figs 1. and 2 for selected diversity branches L and Nakagami parameter m. Fig. 1 shows for L = 5,4,3,2, 1 and m = 1 (Rayleigh). Fig. 2 shows for L = 5 , 4 , 3 and m = 0.5 and 2. We have checked the results with the literature and perfect agreement exists [4] . Since branch fading is assumed to be statistically independent, and ak,ls are Nakagami random variables, y also follows the Nakagami distribution with parameter a Lm [6] , with the pdf
Results: The error probability performance can be obtained by averaging the probability of error conditioned on the fading over the pdf of (3). For BPSK the unconditional probability of error can be expressed thus
Conclzision:
A simple but exact expression has been derived for BPSK with an MRC receiver in Nakagami fading. The expression is valid for all values of m, fast to compute and is computationally efficient.
Introduction: Diffie and Hellman first proposed key agreement protocol to establish a session key for two parties [l] . However, the protocol was later proven to be vulnerable to the unknown-key attack by Diffie et al.
[2] because the protocol did not include any key authentication process during the negotiation between the two parties [3, 41. In 1997, Ham first proposed the authenticated key agreement protocol [5] without using a one-way hash function 161. In 1998, Ham and Lin proposed an authenticated multiple-key agreement protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman distribution scheme [7] . There are two main features in this protocol: it operates without using a oneway hash function and it enables two communication entities to share multiple secret keys. Later, indicated that the Ham-Lin protocol is not secure because an attacker can successfully forge a short-term public key pair and pass the verification equation. Then, they proposed an improved Ham-Lin protocol to get rid of this shortcoming. However, in 1999, Wu et al. [9] pointed out that the Yen-Joye protocol is insecure and can be successfully attacked the same way as the Ham-Lin protocol. Wu et al. then proposed a protocol to enhance the security.
Nevertheless, the protocol violated the original expectation of the Ham-Lin protocol that no one-way hash function should be used in the authenticated key agreement protocol.
In this Letter, we shall propose a modification of the Yen-Joye protocol. The modification does not only ameliorate the security but also is more efficient than Ham's protocol proposed in 2001 [lo] .
Review of Yen-Joye protocol: In this Section, we shall briefly review the Yen-Joye protocol [8] . There are two phases in the protocol. The first phase is the authentication phase where two users exchange n temporary random public keys in an authenticated way. The second phase is the key-sharing phase where the users share n2 -1 secret keys with each other.
There are two users Alice and Bob who want to establish multiple keys by the protocol. Here, we only describe what Alice has to do because Bob has to do basically the same. Initially, the system has a large prime p, and a is a primitive number in GF(P). Alice has a longterm secret key xA and the corresponding long-term public key yA = mod p. Then Alice randomly generates two short-term secret keys kAl and kA2 and computes their corresponding short-term public keys rA1 =akA' mod p and rA2=&f2 modp, respectively. The range of rA1 and rA2 is set to be (rp/2, p -11) so that no attacker can forge the keys. Alice computes the signature SA through rAl and rA2 as
where kA = kA I . kA2 mod p . Finally, Alice sends rA I, rA2, sA, cert(yA) to Bob, where cert(yA) is a certificate for Alice's public key yA. After receiving them, Bob verifies them via the computation as follows:
If it holds, Bob establishes the multiple secret keys in the second phase. Bob can derive the session keys as follows:
Here, three of the four keys can be used because of perfect forward secrecy [l 11. Thus, three authenticated session keys can be established in this protocol. However, the Ham-Lin protocol is not as efficient as the Yen-Joye protocol. In this Letter, we propose two straightforward modifications to enhance the security of the Yen-Joye protocol. The proposed protocol can withstand the attack on Wu et al's scheme and is more efficient than [lo] . First, we suggest that the pair of short-term public keys rAl and rA2 in the generation phase should be prime numbers. This modification can help the new scheme prevent the attacker from forging another pair  (r;,, rL2) because the prime numbers are unique. In addition, it obeys the original requirement of the Ham-Lin protocol that the range of rAl and rA2 should be in (1, p -1) . Secondly, we suggest that the great common divisor (GCD) of rAl and rA2 should be equal to 1. This suggestion is to prevent the attacker from finding the factor q of rAl or rA2. Furthermore, the range of rA I and rA2 will fall in the (rp/21, p -1) as the Yen-Joye protocol proposed. Both of the modifications of on the Yen-Joye protocol can make it secure against any forgery of the pair (rAl, rA2) . Besides, our modification protocol is more efficient than the Ham-Lin protocol [lo] because we only perform the exponentiation computation four times, less than six times required by the Ham-Lin protocol.
Conclusion:
We have proposed an improved scheme to enhance the security of the Yen-Joye protocol. We require that rA I and rA2 should be primes or GCD(rAI, rA2) should be equal to 1 to withstand the attack of forging another pair (~LI, rL2) so that rA1 . rA2 = r A l . r~2 .
The pair rAl and rA2 should be made unique so that no attacker can find another pair to replace them. Furthermore, the Harn-Lin protocol [lo] uses six exponentiation computations, while the Yen-Joye scheme four takes only. That means the Ham-Lin protocol is less efficient.
In this Letter, we have proposed two straightforward modifications to withstand the forgery attack on the Yen-Joye protocol. The proposed protocol retains the original expectation on the Ham-Lin protocol that the range of the short-term public key be (1, p -1). Furthermore, the new protocol uses fewer exponentiation computations than the Ham-Lin protocol [lo].
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Key function of normal basis multipliers in GF(2")
Haining Fan and Yiqi Dai
A new definition of the key function in GF(2") is given. Based on this definition, a method to speed up software implementations of the normal basis multiplication is presented. It is also shown that the normal basis with maximum complexity can be used to design low complexity multipliers, In particular, it is shown that the circuit complexity of a type 1 optimal normal basis multiplier can be further reduced.
Introduction; An important advance in GF(2") arithmetic is the Massey-Omura algorithm. It is well known that the realisation of GF(2") operations can be made more efficient by choosing optimal normal basis or low complexity normal basis [l] . Since the complexity of the normal basis multipliers depends on the choice of key function for multiplication, it is desirable to have a key function with minimal complexity to implement the multiplication algorithm [2] . In this Letter, we give a new definition of the key function and present a method to speed up software implementations of the normal basis multiplication. We also show that the circuit complexity of a type I optimal normal basis multiplier can be further reduced.
Preliminaries: Let y be an element of GF(2"), for simplicity, denote y2' by y z . Given a normal basis N = {Po, PI, b2, . . . , fl,t-l} of GF(2") over GF(2), a field element A can be represented by a binary vector (ao, a l , . . . , with respect to this basis as A = C:'=-a, . b,, where a, E GF(2) and i=O, 1 , . . . , n -1.
For 1 5 i 5 n -1, let popi = XC; 4,. ;Pi be the expansion of bobI with respect to the normal basis N, & E GF(2). Let R={0,1, . . . , n-I}, Si={j14i, , =l}, h, =ISiI, and T, ={j14i, j= 0). Obviously, S i n z=@ and S,U T<=R. Write Si as Si= { w~,~, wi,2, . . . , wi,rtj}, where 0 5 wi,l < w ; ,~ < . . . wt,/,, 5 n -1. Clearly, popi = Note that for a particular normal basis N, the representation of flOfii is Let (x) denote the non-negative residue of x mod n. D = A 5 can be C;Llbw,,k. Based on this identity and the symmetry of S, [l, 31, a multiplication algorithm is given in [3] .
Let D= (do, d l , . . . , dn-J be the binary vector of D=AB with respect to the normal basis N, the key functionfof N is defined as
Recall that Si is defined as Si= c\4z,j= 1). When k=n -1 -j runs through S,, we have
The circuit complexity of a normal basis multiplier depends on the key function for multiplication. In [2], the complcxity of multiplication with respect to the normal basis N is defined as the quantity C,"= 1 + C:=;'h,, where h,= ISJ.
New key function; Recall that the trace function of A E GF(2") over Now define 6, = where i = 1,2,. . . , n -1.
We have D = @&A), + 5 (B&A,-,) , ,=I keS, Thus software normal basis multiplication algorithms of [3] , which are designed for all normal bases of GF(2"), can be speeded up by the following method: first, select i's such that IS,( -17;1 > c (for example, c= 2); then for each selected i, compute CkEs,(5&A,-i)k using the identity Ckes8(E&An-i)k= TY(~&A,-~) + Eke @&An-Jk. This method saves (Si( -IT,( field addition operations for each selected i (excluding computation of TY(B&A,,-~) ).
In particular, when N is a type I optimal normal basis, the only i satisfying ISil ->c is n/2. In this case, POPi= 1 = r L : P k , S, = (0, 1, . . . , n -I } and (TI = 0. Thus n field addition operations (50%) are saved at the cost of a single trace computation (the total number of
